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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890463-CA 
v. : 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a 
second degree felony, after a bench trial in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether this Court should remand the case for 
additional factual findings without determining the 
constitutionality of the roadblock stop? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings, 
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of 
review. State v. Johnson, 771, P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.) 
cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988) (R. 7). Defendant was convicted 
as charged after a bench trial based on stipulated facts on June 
20, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Juab 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding 
(R. 142-45). Defendant was sentenced by Judge Ballif on July 28, 
1989, to serve a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison and ordered to pay a fine of $1,250 and an additional 
$312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund. Id. Defendant's prison 
sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a 
period of eighteen months. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are fully stated in the Brief of Respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are three reasons this Court should remand the 
case to the trial court without a determination of the legality 
of the roadblock stop. First, the trial court can effectively 
determine whether defendant's voluntary consent came by 
exploitation of the roadblock stop by assuming arguendo that the 
stop was illegal. Second, even if this Court determined the 
roadblock stop was illegal, a remand is inevitable to consider 
exploitation. Third, the trial court's factual findings on the 
roadblock stop are inadequate for this Court to conduct 
meaningful review. Thus, a determination of the legality of the 
roadblock stop at this juncture is unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE 
FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL FINDINGS 
In his supplemental brief, defendant requests this 
Court to reverse and remand this case to the district court to 
determine if the evidence seized from the search of his vehicle 
was obtained through exploitation of the roadblock stop. (See 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 13). The State concedes that 
at least a remand is necessary for a full factual inquiry and 
determination on the issue of exploitation. However, this Court 
need not determine the legality of the roadblock stop as a 
prerequisite to a remand. 
As this Court is aware, the fate of the present case 
was altered by the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State 
v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah June 28, 1990). In 
Arroyo, the district court determined that no traffic violation 
had occurred and that the police officer had stopped the 
defendant only as a pretext. Jd. at 13. However, the district 
court also ruled that the "defendant consented to the search of 
the vehicle." .Id. Nevertheless, the district court granted the 
defendant's suppression motion, ^d. The State appealed to this 
Court, challenging the district court's suppression order. Id. 
This Court reversed the district court's suppression order on the 
basis that defendant's voluntary consent to search vitiated the 
taint of the unconstitutional pretext stop. State v. Arroyo, 770 
P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
this Court's ruling. State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. 
The reason for reversal was that the trial court's finding of 
consent lacked any evidentiary support. Id. at 14. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district 
court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent. Id. at 
18. 
In order to assist the district court in its inquiry, 
the Supreme Court explained the parameters of the consent issue 
to be explored by the district court on remand. Id. at 15. The 
Supreme Court stated that there are two factors to be considered 
in determining whether consent is lawfully obtained following 
initial police misconduct: (1) whether the consent was voluntary; 
and (2) whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation 
of the prior illegality. Ici. (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987). As the basis for the 
second part of the two-part analysis, the Court relied upon the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Id. The Wong Sun test considers 
M
'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" 371 U.S. at 
488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). 
In the present case, the State produced evidence of 
defendant's consent and the trial court specifically found "no 
evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary 
character of the consent given to the search of the car, 
including the trunk where marijuana was found" (R. Ill) (T. 11, 
13). Admittedly, however, the trial court did not inquire 
whether, assuming the roadblock stop was illegal, defendant's 
voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation of that illegality 
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to vitiate any 
taint. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. Of course, this inquiry 
was not made because the trial court found the roadblock stop 
constitutional under both the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The trial court simply inferred that if the 
roadblock was legal, defendant's voluntary consent was not 
obtained by exploitation. 
The primary issue this Court must now determine is 
whether it is necessary to decide the roadblock issue at this 
juncture. It is not. First, it is unnecessary to conclusively 
determine the legality of the roadblock stop prior to determining 
whether voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation. On 
remand, the trial court can conduct its factual inquiry into the 
exploitation issue assuming arguendo that the stop was illegal. 
All relevant factors surrounding defendant's consent can be 
explored under the parameters set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Arroyo. By utilizing this method, the two-part Arroyo test 
can be applied without reaching the roadblock issue. 
Second, even if this Court were to determine that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional, the case should, as defendant 
suggests, be remanded to the trial court for a determination 
whether defendant's voluntary consent was obtained through 
exploitation. 
Third, the evidence developed in the trial court and 
that court's findings on the roadblock issue are inadequate for 
this Court to conduct a detailed constitutional analysis as was 
done by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan Department of 
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990). Therefore, a 
determination of the constitutionality of the roadblock based on 
this record would be imprudent, in addition to being unnecessary. 
If the Court believes the roadblock issue needs to be resolved, 
the case should be remanded to the trial court for the 
development of evidence on that issue and for further factual and 
legal determination in light of Sitz. Cf. State v. Lovegren, No. 
890350-CA, slip op. at 8-9 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990) (a 
This procedure is not unlike the two-prong ineffectiveness test 
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984), under 
which a reviewing court need not consider whether counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance if it is shown that no prejudice 
could have resulted. Likewise, in the present case, if the trial 
court determines on remand that defendant's voluntary consent was 
not obtained by exploitation of the stop, then it need not 
further examine the legality of the roadblock. This alternate 
method is suggested because it may often be easier for a trial 
court to dispose of a suppression motion by determining whether 
consent was obtained by exploitation of a stop, without 
determining the legality of the stop. 
remand for more detailed findings is in order where a trial 
court's findings in a suppression ruling are inadequate to permit 
meaningful review on appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to remand the case to the trial court to 
determine whether defendant's voluntary consent came by way of 
exploitation of the roadblock stop. 
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